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Abstract:      
The robustness of the public domain is an essential condition for creation and innovation. In 
particular, the public domain functions as a device within intellectual property law to allow 
certain uses of valuable signs, symbols, images and information, in both commercial and non-
commercial speech. The public domain, articulated as limiting principles and doctrines in law 
also functions as limitations where the protection does not reach and the rights may not be 
asserted. In this sense, the concept of public domain is used as one way to balance the 
fundamental right of freedom of expression and protection of intellectual property. Focusing on 
the concept of the public domain in trade mark law, with the example of how referential uses of 
signs in both commercial and cultural context are regulated, this chapter explores changes in law 
that affect this balances. In particular, this chapter examines how the availability of signs to 
communicate to the public cultural meanings and the cultural experiences of the public is 
affected by the various impulses in trademark law to protect the investments. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
The distinction between the public and the private domain is central to any legal system and 
the rule of law. The balancing of the interests of the private and the public is perennial theme 
for  decision-making and scholarship in intellectual property. In  intellectual property, the 
public private distinction becomes more complex, as the law not only has to define the legal 
boundary of a private right, the law needs to construct and define the correlating object itself, 
without tangible boundary. Additionally, when the values are generated by associating with 
what have been previously accepted as the scope of a right, assigning rights to the claims over 
the values arising out of the association is also one important task of the law. 
Two aspects of the laws in the distinction of the public and private spheres have been 
highlighted in the previous chapters in this book. First, the law may protect expressions, signs, 
images and information in private sphere against the harm from undue intrusion of the public, 
as in the case of privacy and confidence.2 Although there are available alternative means of 
regulation and  protection, such  as  contractual and  technical self-help measures, the  law 
provides a safety net of protection when such measures fail to protect. Secondly, not all the 
values arising out of intangible resources are to be attributed as rights and the law of 
intellectual property law delineates the boundary of the private property right. By doing so, 
intellectual property law not only clarifies the private property claims over the values arising 
out of the use of intangible resources but also preserve and protect the interests of the public. 
More specifically, the doctrines in intellectual property law on the categories of protectable 
subject matters and the limitation on the scope of rights function as a means to ensure the 
balance of the public and the private interests. 
The aspect of law in the protection of the public interests become more crucial, when 
the interaction between the public and the private right holders generate values to the 
intellectual resources that are seen to be in the public domain. The previous chapters in this 
book have documented a general trend in intellectual property and unfair competition laws in 
Europe and elsewhere that more values attached to signs, images and information have lead to 
the claims for more protections. It was noted that there are budding corresponding rights of 
exclusion, as either a new breed of right, analogous to intellectual property right, 3 or through 
extension of existing right or sui generis covering various uses of symbols, images and 
information. 4  When  the  protection  in  law  is  either  uncertain  or  unclear,  private  actors 
increasingly resort to self-help measures of contracts to protect their interests over the uses of 
valuable images and information against imitation. Pervasiveness of  these measures and 
claims based on these measures challenge court and law makers with the decision if and to 
what extent, should the law give meaning to the measures of protection. In some jurisdiction, 
the legislative solution is sought through unfair competition prevention law which seem to 
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directly regulate the conduct of slavish imitation as such, without examining the creative or 
innovative qualities of underlying subject matters.5 In UK, the courts are seen to be imposing 
a duty of confidence to a third party to a contract, against the uses of misappropriated images 
and  information  for  commercial  gain. 6 At  European  level,  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the 
European Union (ECJ) seems to acknowledge the claims of the trade mark holders to capture 
values arising out of nearly all aspects and uses of a sign.7 
Against this backdrop, it is timely to revisit the status of the public domain at the 
interface  of  trade  mark  and  unfair  competition  laws.  In  particular,  at  the  interface  of 
intellectual property, unfair competition and publicity claims, available signs including 
symbols,  words,  images  and  information  for  the  public  to  create  and  communicate the 
meaning are seen to be shrinking. This chapter revisits the meaning of public interest and 
public domain in the context of expanding intellectual property and investment protection 
claims. As concrete problems arise and the courts need to solve the disputes with facts that do 
not necessarily respect the conceptual boundaries in laws, overlaps and convergences in the 
concepts in intellectual property law, unfair competition law and contracts are unavoidable. 
However,  the  convergences  of  legal  concepts  do  not  necessarily  mean  a  uniform  and 
expansive protection of the rights and claim holders. A broad concept of the public domain 
that articulates the interest of the public is often used as a tool to ensure the interests of the 
consumers, users and competitors. 
The robustness of the public domain is an essential condition for creation and 
innovation. In particular, the public domain functions as a device within intellectual property 
law to allow certain uses of valuable signs, symbols, images and information, in both 
commercial  and  non-  commercial  speech.  The  public  domain,  articulated  as  limiting 
principles and doctrines in law also functions as limitations where the protection does not 
reach and the rights may not be asserted. In this sense, the concept of public domain is used as 
one way to balance the fundamental right of freedom of expression and protection of 
intellectual property. Focusing on the concept of the public domain in trade mark law, with 
the example of how referential uses of signs in both commercial and cultural context are 
regulated, this chapter explores changes in law that affects this balances. In particular, this 
chapter  examines  how  the  availability  of  signs  to  communicate  to  the  public  cultural 
meanings and the cultural experiences of the public is affected by the various impulses in 
trade mark law to protect the investments. 
 
 
 
2.  Interests of Public in the Regulation of Commercial Speech 
 
 
In the context of copyright, the public domain is considered “the law’s primary safeguard of 
the raw material that makes authorship possible.”8 In other words, the public domain is where 
the limitation for a private claim is set and the claims of private rights do not reach. In other 
intellectual property rights, the public domain functions as a metaphor of a pool of resources 
where creative works, innovative ideas and symbols and signs that may be reserved for the 
 
 
 
 
 
5 See, Tamura Yoshiyuki, ‘Protection of the first mover advantage – regulation against imitation 
of the product configuration in Japan,’ chapter 9 of this book. 
6 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 
7 See for example, ECJ, case C-236-238/08, Google v Louis Vuitton et al [2010], E.C.R. I-02417 
and ECJ, case C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure, [2009] E.C.R I-5185, See also  ECJ, case C-206/01, Arsenal Football 
Club v Matthew Reed, [2002] E.C.R. I-10273. See Van der Laan, Nicole, ‘The Use of Trade Marks in Keyword 
Advertising. Developments in ECJ and National Jurisprudence,’ chapter 10 of this book. 
8 Litman, Jessica, (1990) ‘The Public Domain,’ 39 Emory L. J. 956 at 967. 
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benefit of the public against the private claims.9 While the concept itself is diverse and 
various explanations for its functions are found, there seems to be a consensus that certain 
subject matters such as “scientific mathematical principles, ideas, concepts and theories, 
words, names and numbers and symbols, information, facts, data and expired or unclaimed 
rights” are within the public domain.10 
As an academic concept, the public domain is often seen to serve a function of 
safeguarding the interests of the public so that essential building blocks for creations and 
innovation remain available, accessible, and without being subject to the private claims. For 
example, scientific principles and mathematical equations, concepts, theories, discoveries as 
such are seen to be in the public domain as these subject matters are viewed as building 
blocks of innovation and creation, or as fundamental tools of commerce. Here, the public 
domain is seen to safeguard against the private ownership claims of these subject matters, 
because the inherent values of these resources are too great for the society to subject them to 
the private claims. 
The doctrines in intellectual property laws that enshrine the concept of public domain 
operate in manners corresponding to the particular types of intellectual property right, such as 
the rules that define the duration of a right, excluded subject matters, and the scope of rights 
and allowed uses. As copyrights and patents are time limited, the public domain is a concept 
that is often temporarily tied to the duration of the right. All the works and inventions whose 
rights have expired would be in the public domain and would remain available in the public 
domain, in principle. Under the more conduct oriented regulations, such as unfair competition 
prevention laws, the definition of “harm” in the regulation is ultimately shaped by the 
underlying concept of the public interests and honest business practices, and thus, in a sense, 
though definition of harmful conducts11 the concerns for the public domain are reflected in the 
law. In contrast, under the trade mark law where the rights are not necessarily subject to the 
temporal limit, the public interests represented by the public domain become operational 
through the limiting doctrines to protection and assertion of rights, such as the definition of 
the mark and the trade mark use doctrines. The public domain in this context functions as a 
tool that ensures intellectual property protection does not hinder fundamental freedom of 
expression and communication that are essential to the functioning democracy. 
In contrast, in other cases, such as subject matters which are yet unclaimed, the public 
domain is perceived simply as a reservoir of subject matters which may yet to become subject 
to property claims later. A good example would be a sign which is considered inherently 
indistinctive and yet may become protected as trade marks if they acquire distinctiveness 
through use in relations to certain class of goods or services.12   Such signs before use would 
be considered to be in the public domain and yet, when used and acquire distinctiveness and 
started to function as an indicator of origin, become subject to private claims of trade mark. 
The public domain described in the above encourages uses. In contrast, the public 
domain  is  manifested  through  the  concepts  of  public  policy,  and  morality,  sometimes 
functions to restrict the commercial and arbitrary uses of certain subject matters of intellectual 
property. One good example is enshrined in the paragraph 2 of the article 27 of the TRIPs 
 
9 See for example, Rose, Carol M. (2003), ‘Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions 
of Public Property in the Information Age’, 66 Law and Contemporary Problems Vol. 66, No. 1/2, pp. 89-110. 
10 See for example, Samuelson, Pamela (2006) ‘Challenges in Mapping the Public Domain,’ In: 
The Future of the Public Domain- Identifying the Commons in Information Law, eds by Guibault Lucie and 
Hugenholtz P Bernt. (2006) Kluwer Law International, pp 7-25. 
11 Ohly, Ansgar, ‘Interfaces between Trade Mark Protection and Unfair Competition Law – 
Confusion about Confusion and Misconceptions about Misappropriation,’ chapter 2 of this book. See also 
Westkamp, supra n. 4. 
12 For example, signs that may fall under Art.7(1)(b) and (c) Art.7(3) of the Community 
Trademark Regulation, Council Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 of  26 February 2009 on the Community trade 
mark. 
4 DRAFT Chapter_ EIPIN SERIES_ Intellectual Property, Unfairness and Speech  
 
 
 
agreement which allows the member states to exclude from patentability “inventions, the 
prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of which is necessary to 
protect ordre public or morality.”13 These excluded subject matters are in principle considered 
to be in the public domain, but here the concept functions not to encourage uses of the subject 
matter but rather as a way to prevent these subject matters from being exploited in ways that 
socially undesirable. 
The public domain has yet quite different meaning and context in the discussion for 
the personality rights and publicity rights. For example, the very personal nature of the 
personal data may demand protection against the publication of the data and misappropriation 
from the concern for human dignity and fundamental freedoms.14 In the context of privacy 
and confidence protection, the public domain may imply the actual location and the place of 
the information that disqualifies the protection for confidence or privacy.15 At the same time, 
the publicity and the public aspect of the persons involved may yet call for a different manner 
and forms of protection than confidential information, as the values of the information arise 
out of the very public nature of the persons and the subject matters involved, and not from the 
non-disclosure.16 The very public nature of the public persona makes some information 
relevant for the public as open communication and transparency as well as the accountability 
of the persons holding public offices is crucial for democratic society. For this reason, the 
public may  even demand an  access to  the  personal information of  public persona. The 
public’s access to information however needs to be balanced with the necessity to protect the 
privacy of the personal information. Recent scandalous and intrusive practices by journalists 
to collect information on celebrities17 highlighted the necessity to balance the freedom of 
expression including the right to information, as expressed the article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Convention18 with the necessity to protect confidence 
and privacy, as expressed as a right to respect for private and family life, in the article 8 of the 
ECHR.19 
In contrast to the comparatively clear rationale for freedom of information and 
communication with privacy claims, the necessity to balance the investment protection with 
the freedom of the public to engage in the commercial expression and to compete may be less 
clear. The notion that the intellectual property should not hinder flourishing of democratic 
discourses and communication of idea is not alien in Europe.20 In principle, various principles 
and doctrines in the law implements the idea that intellectual property rights should not hinder 
 
 
13 WTO Agreement on Trade Related Aspects  of Intellectual Property Rights, Article 27, para 2. 
14 See Phillipson, G., ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of 
Privacy under the Human Rights Act,’ The Modern Law Review, No. 66, pp 726–758 (2003); Prins, Corien, 
‘Property and Privacy : European Perspectives and the Commodification of our Identity’ in Guibault L, & B. 
Hugenholtz (eds) (2006), The Future of the Public Domain, Kluwer International  pp223-257. 
15 Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2007] UKHL 21, [2008] 1 AC 1, para 122 per Lord Hoffmann. See 
Phillipson, supra n.14, exploring the degree of publicity in the common law. 
16 Griffith, Jonathan, ‘The Public Interest in the UK – Copyright and Celebrity Rights’ chapter 11 
of this book  See also Schmitt, Kerstin, ‘Commercial Exploitation of Persona: The German Experience’, chapter 
6 of this book. 
17 The scandal of phone hacking by the journalist of the News of the World has led to UK-wide 
Leveson Inquiry on the culture, practice and ethics of the press. See  http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/ (last- 
accessed on 12.11.2011). 
18 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), signed in Rome on 4 November 1950. 
19 See for example, Mosley v News Group Newspapers [2008] EWHC 1777 (QB). 
20 See, e.g. Sakulin, Wolfgang, Trademark and Freedom of expression, An Inquiry into the 
Conflict between Trademark Rights and Freedom of Expression under European, German, and Dutch Law, 
Kluwer Law International (2010), Griffiths Jonathan and Uma Suthersanen (eds.), Copyright and Free Speech, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2005) and Hugenholtz, P.B., ‘Copyright and Freedom of Expression in 
Europe,’ in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Harry First and Diane Leenheer Zimmerman (eds.), Expanding the 
Boundaries of Intellectual Property, Oxford: Oxford University Press  (2001). 
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the exercise of core freedoms that are ensured by the Constitution in a democratic society. 
However, it  is  still contested whether a  commercial speech (i.e. communicating for  the 
purpose of commercial transaction) using protected signs and symbols and information need 
to be promoted under the rubric of freedom of expression such as the article 10 of ECHR.21 
The question gets more clearly illustrated by exploring the referential uses of signs and 
the freedom of commercial communication. Referential use is particularly important in the 
context of the current popular culture, where the reference to various symbols and images is 
an important foundation for meaning making. Political and cultural discourse in a democratic 
society is often done through references. The scholars in media studies have long recognized 
the importance of meaning creation using symbols and images in “semiotic democracy.”22 In 
a semiotic democracy, the public as the consumers participate in the process of creation of 
meanings in a society actively using symbols and signs. As Madows observed, the consumers 
“recode” and “rework” the cultural and industrial commodities to “express meanings different 
from the ones intended or preferred by their producers.”23    The “recoding” or “reworking” 
requires reference to known signs and symbols and images that represents the preconceived 
cultural and industrial commodities. The ability of the public as an empowered and active 
audience is viewed as core element of this concept of semiotic democracy and the capacity to 
refer is considered crucial. The impact of intellectual property rights on the capacity have lead 
to the debates to expand or restrict the intellectual property rights’ coverage of the creations 
and signs generated and derivatively used by the users and consumers.24 
A trade mark often represents the preconceived signs for a particular commodity and 
functions primary as a reference. A trade mark functions from three focal points: the sign 
(trade mark) as a signifier, the meaning that the sign represents (the signified), and the goods 
or service as a referent.25 The function of a trade mark which forms the bases of the legal 
protection  is  often  based  on  the  first  or  secondary  association  as  an  origin  indicator.26 
However as a sign, a trade mark may acquire a tertiary meanings as an index of a broader set 
of association.27 When a trade mark acquires a meaning as an index in a class of a good or 
services that a sign represents, it would be considered to have become generic which may 
eventually lead to invalidation of the protection.28 However when it becomes an index of a set 
of association in an unrelated context, a trade mark may validly coexist with the reference to 
this indexical meaning. For  example, while the registered word  trade mark Barbie may 
indicate the origin of a doll as a product from Mattel, the word Barbie also has now become 
 
 
 
21 See, for example, Sakulin, supra n. 20 at 109-111. 
22 Fiske, John, Television culture (1987), reprinted by Routlege (2010) 2nd edition at 238. 
23 Madow, Michael, ‘Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights,’ 
(1993) 81 Cal. L.Rev. 127at 139. 
24 See, for example, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure Of 
Intellectual Property Law pp. 167-68; Compare, e.g., Madow, supra n. 23,  Fisher, William W, ‘Promises to 
Keep: Technology, Law and the Future of Entertainment’ (Stanford University Press, 2004). See also, Beebe, 
Barton (2005), ‘Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law,’ 103 Mich.L.Rev. 2020 at 2059-60, comparing two 
strands of expansionist and reductionist approaches and characterizing the perspective of active consumers as 
the “third way“ with a view of empowered consumer in the context of  two opposing impulse of apologist and 
reductionist in trade mark law scholarship in the US. 
25 See Beebe, Barton, ‘The Semiotic Account of Trademark Doctrine and Trademark Culture’, in 
Trademark Law and Theory: A Handbook of Contemporary Research, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis 
eds. (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2008) pp 44-45. 
26 Secondary if a primary association is inherently non distinctive and a trade mark protection is 
based on the acquired meaning through use. 
27 Spence, Michael, ‘Restricting Allusion to a Trade Mark’ in Trademark Law and Theory: A 
Handbook of Contemporary Research, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds. (Edward Elgar Publishers, 
2008) pp 338-39. 
28 Id. 
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an index for a particular type of a woman.29 As an index, a trade mark function as a signal, a 
referent to another sign, and not as an indicator of source for goods and services.30 
The duality or plurality of meanings coexisting around one signifier and one referent 
raises the question of degree of protection - to what degree the right holder to the mark may 
control the use of the meanings in other contexts, even when the meanings were generated or 
created largely by the consumers. Both the public and the right holder (sign owner) participate 
in the creation of meaning and to be meaningful, the sign needs to be communicated to the 
public, either  through  referencing the  sign  directly or  through  referencing the  goods  or 
services bearing the signs. The conduct of using signs as references to communicate the 
information concerning another goods or services may be considered a conduct of “riding on 
coattails31 of another or a conduct seeking the “truth in the market place.”32 
Referential use of the sign by the consumers beyond using the goods or service is also 
on the increase. Modern advertising practices of aspirational and lifestyle branding 
aggressively invite the consumers to participate and to communicate images and symbols as 
an indication of a life style so that “the brand” becomes more desirable.33 To increase the 
value of a sign beyond the source indicator, the producers invest and engage in interactive 
marketing to attract potential consumers of their aspirational products. The public is not only 
the recipients of the primary referential meaning that trade mark aims to deliver, but also they 
are participants in the creation and additional values of the signs by using signs as a means of 
communication and creating secondary or tertiary referential meanings. Reputation created in 
this manner often is fed back to the value of the sign, as the trade mark with reputation will be 
protected more extensively.34 
In a commercial context, the interest of the public is manifested as the interest of the 
consumers and competitors who are recipients and provider of the information and expression 
in the course of trade.35 However, the public is a group of individuals with heterogeneous 
interests and motivation. A consumer could be either “a sovereign” who makes economic 
decision to maximize utility with unbounded rationality or “a gullible fool” whose choices 
may be swayed and confused by the advertising.36 As a consumer, the public may be seen to 
actively contribute to the creation of meanings and values37 or may be seen to passively 
regurgitate the information and meaning fed to them.38 If  each consumer is a sovereign 
making free and rational economic choices, their interests are exercised by their choices of 
products or services bearing certain signs. As a corollary, the public interest in this regard is 
reflected in their legitimate choices. If a consumer who is an informed and empowered 
sovereign making rational choices, their interests may become manifested by their choices by 
 
 
29 In the US, the Ninth circuit had explicitly dealt with the indexical meaning used in parody. 
Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002), where a song “Barbie girl” was ruled allowed as 
it was a parody use of a trade mark. 
30 Dreyfuss Rochelle C., ‘Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation’, 65 Notre Dame L. Rev. 397–424, 411 (1990). 
31 L’Oréal v Bellure (2009), supra n.7 at para.49. 
32 L'Oreal SA & Ors v Bellure NV & Ors [2010] EWCA Civ 535 (21 May 2010)  at para.9. 
33 Englis, Basil G. and Michael R. Solomon, ‘To Be and Not to Be: Lifestyle Imagery, Reference 
Groups, and "The Clustering of America"’, Journal of Advertising, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring, 1995), pp. 13-28 
34 Paris Convention  Article 6bis and, TRIPs Article 16(3), See in Europe, Art. 5(2) Trade Mark 
Directive and Art. 9(1)(c) Community Trade Mark Regulation. See among others,  ECJ, L’Oréalc Bellure, supra 
n.  7 at  para.  36. Compare,  in  Japan,  Trade  Mark  Act  Sec.  4(1)(x),  (xv),  (xix)  and  the  Unfair  Competition 
Prevention Act, sec 2(1)(i) and (ii). 
35 Ohly, supra n.11. 
36 See Brown, Ralph S. Jr., ‘Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade 
Symbols,’ 57 Yale L.J. 1165 (1948), at 1180. See also Beebe, supra n.24  at 2023-34. 
37 See also Litman, Jessica, ‘Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age’, 
108 Yale L.J. 1717 (1999). 
38 Brown, supra n. 36 at 1187-88. 
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free election of goods and services bearing the signs. The function of the public domain for 
these  consumers  in  making  rational  economic  choices  would  then  be  that  sufficiently 
exercised as long as the signs inform the recipient clearly. The protection of the signs, then 
should be such degree that the information should be truthfully communicated to the 
consumers and to the degree that the competitor’s use of the signs are the only available 
means of truthfully communicating the information. 
In contrast, if a “model” consumer of the law and regulation is the one who gets easily 
confused by advertising, regulations of using signs should be such that references to other 
signs should be strictly controlled to avoid confusion. Trader’s freedom to inform the 
consumers of their products should be done in such manner that any imitation or reference to 
other signs that may create double meanings, association or reminding the consumers of the 
producers of other goods or services has to be minimized.39 
As consumers cannot be identical regardless which model that the laws and regulation 
adopt, there would be a gap as the actual consumers and their consumption do not match the 
model pattern of consumption. Similarly, traders-competitors may be uniformly seeking to 
manipulate the gullible consumers or to truthfully inform the knowledgeable or empowered 
consumers. The consumers and competitors use the sign as a means of communication and 
language regardless of whether the consumers may do so as an active empowered collaborator 
in the creation of value or not.40 Perversely, if the public, as a consumer, participates more 
actively in the process of meaning creation and add diverse uses of a sign, it would increase 
more diverse perception of a sign. As the consumer perception is core concept in founding 
protection, this in turn may increase the likelihood of confusion and may justify the claims for 
more protection associated with the reputation of the sign. Furthermore, the rights are seen to 
be  expanding  through  licensing  practices  by  risk  averse  users  and  the  feedback  of  the 
practices into the law, even without changes in the positive laws.41 
In sum, the values and rights over the signs and words used in the commercial speech 
have a marked circular relationship. The law protects a sign, because it is a thing of value, 
representing the goodwill in connection to goods or services, but the sign itself independently 
may become valuable, because the law protects it as a thing of value.42 The value of a sign or 
a trade mark exists, as long as there is the goodwill that consumers associate the sign with. 
However it is valuable against the competitors as long as the law protects it as such. The more 
value is attached to it, the more claims may be made for the protection for the value arising 
out of using a sign. The circularity of protection becomes clearer in the protection of signs 
with  reputation  against  unfair  competition. 43  While  unfair  competition  laws  in  various 
jurisdictions provide different approaches of regulation, the protection is often tied to what the 
law essentially prohibits as unfair conducts that harm the competition against honest business 
practices.44  When business practices are forming using new technology, such as keyword 
 
39 See Tushnet, Rebecca. ’Towards Symmetry in the Law of Branding,’ 21 Fordham Intell. 
Prop.Media & Ent L.J. 971(2011), arguing that over expansive protection based on broad consumer confusion 
may discourage the trade mark holder to control the quality of publicity. 
40 Litman, supra n. 37 at 1730. 
41 Gibson, James, ‘Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law,’ 116 Yale 
Law Journal 882 at 907-926. 
42 Cohen, Felix, ’Transcendental nonsense and the functional approach,’  35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 
(1935) at 814-817. This circularity has been expressed as a thesis of “if value then right” thesis. See Dreyfuss, 
supra n. 30. 
43 Id. See also Kur, supra n. 3. 
44 See for example, the dilution like protection under the TRIPs agreement in Article 16(3) which 
applies the article 6bis oft he Paris convention (1967) reads, ‘Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall 
apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods or services which are not similar to those in respect of which a trade mark is 
registered, provided that use of that trade mark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection 
between those goods or services and the owner of the registered trade mark and provided that the interests of the 
owner of the registered trade mark are likely to be damaged by such use.’ 
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advertising, an honest business practice may not be stably defined and only with the 
interpretation of law holding it harmful, it becomes an unfair conduct which needs to be 
prohibited. 
Protection against the referential uses of a trade mark with reputation in the trade mark 
law can be analysed in the same vein. When more references are made for a particular sign 
either in a cultural context or in commercial context as in advertising, rights holder may claim 
or demand license fees from the users based on the values generated through references. 
When the law gives legal meaning to the conduct of referencing by restricting or prohibiting 
the particular conduct, such as keyword advertising, new elements are added to the right and 
the conduct becomes part of a right. Thus a right to exclude others from taking the advantage 
of the reputation of a trade mark gets formed45 and not just unfair conduct of free-riding, but 
“all free riding” on the reputation of a trade mark will be restricted. 46 
Perversely, when all values and free-riding uses become attributed as part of the holder 
of trade marks with reputation, trade mark holders not only have a right to arbitrarily control 
the uses of sign, but also have a right to profit from even such uses that are initially deemed 
undesirable for them. In other words, while these undesirable uses are restricted to protect the 
investment the right holder has made on the reputation of the trade mark,47 the trade mark 
holder may license such uses and gain financial profit from it.48 
 
 
 
3.  Public Domain in Trade mark law and Referential Use 
 
 
Public domain in trade mark law may consist of doctrines in the law that restrict the eligibility 
of protection, and that define and limit the scope of conducts including allowed certain uses. 
Referencing to trade marks may be limited or allowed through the operation of these doctrines 
that keep certain signs in the public domain or at least usable, so that references may be made 
both in commercial and non commercial context. However, the conducts of referencing, just 
as the conducts of imitating, are not uniform and thus are not treated uniformly in the law. 
Reference to a meaning often requires a reproduction or a description, comparisons of the 
referent of the signs. References may also be made by deconstructing elements of the sign and 
symbol  and  by  recasting  them  in  different  context.  For  example,  one  may  be  making 
references to the known signs which are protected by trade mark by reproducing the signs 
substantively similar enough that the public could identify the protected mark, and yet in a 
different context. Parody, satire or political commentaries are often more effective when the 
signs including symbols and images are well known, as the communication of the meanings 
would be immediate. Reference in this regard could be done by using the identical or 
substantially similar signs or elements of a trade mark that can be easily recognized by the 
public with particular association.49 Similarly, the artworks of pop arts such as Campbell’s 
Soup Cans by Warhol identically reproducing Campbell’s trade mark logo and symbols 
exemplify that creative works often make references to industrial commodity. In another 
instance, famous authors’ and artist’s names and the title of their works which become index 
of further meaning, may still need to be referred to in cultural context. 
 
 
45                 L’Oréal v Bellure (2009), supra n.7 at para.41 and  para 49, observing that a conduct which 
clearly exploits the marketing effort of another “must be considered to be an advantage that has been unfairly 
taken of the distinctive character or the repute of that mark.” 
46 L’Oréal v Bellure (2010), supra n.32 at para 49. 
47 See ECJ, case C-323/09,  Interflora v. M&S, (2011), at para 98. 
48 See Tushnet, supra n.39. 
49 See for example, Green Peace “VW Darkside“ which combines the word mark symbol of VW 
trade mark to a face mask of the Darth Vader, as a political campaign against Volkswagen’s opposition of CO2 
emission regulation. Images available  http://www.vwdarkside.com/en. Last accessed on 1 March 2012. 
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In commercial context, references may also be made through goods or services in 
comparison to known goods or services identified by trade marks. Typically spare parts or 
replaceable parts for a product may be accurately described referring to trade mark of a 
product. In others, reference made also be made by describing goods or services using the 
trade  marks  of  others.  Typically,  the  quality  of  goods  or  services  following  technical 
standards such as WIFI may only be accurately described by referring to the trade mark for 
the technical standard certification.50 When trade marks are consisted of actual geographical 
names, commercial speech may need to use them to describe the geographical location. 
Similarly, word marks may be referred to as part of slogans of competitors and competitors 
may also refer to goods or services in a comparative advertising. As explored earlier, the 
business model of internet keyword advertising builds upon the technical and legal possibility 
of referring another’s signs and marks. 51 
Three types of typical references emerge among these various uses which may have 
implications in the public domain – 1) references to the public domain signs 2) references to 
protected  trade  marks  in  non-commercial  speech  (i.e.  news  reporting,  cultural,  political 
commentary, including parody or satire, religious communication), and 3) references to 
protected trade marks in commercial speech context (i.e. spare parts, comparative advertising, 
keyword advertising). Public domain signs include signs that are generally excluded from 
protection of trade marks, as well as signs that are not validly protectable as trade marks. Thus 
referencing to the public domain signs is a question concerning whether the sign that is used 
is protected or protectable under the trade mark law as a trade mark. In other words, it is a 
question of eligibility of protection and whether the sign is available to be used. In contrast, 
referencing to trade marks in commercial or non commercial communication is a question of 
scope of protection - whether a particular form of referencing is within the scope of trade 
mark or not, or a question whether the conduct of referencing is generally exempted from the 
protection of trade mark through doctrines in the trade mark law. 
 
 
 
3.1. Reference to the signs in the public domain 
 
Logically, referring to signs which are in the public domain would be outside the protection of 
a trade mark, as no reasonable trade mark claims may be made by the right holders on such 
signs, as such right would not exist. Trade mark laws in different countries often limit the 
eligibility of protection in two different aspects – by categorically excluding certain types of 
signs or by rejecting registration and protections for the signs which are inherently cannot 
serve the function of a trade mark. Categorical exclusions are often absolute in the sense that 
certain indications and signs would never become eligible for protection as a trade mark.52 In 
contrast, when a sign is rejected from protection because it fails to meet the function of a 
mark (i.e. distinctive to indicate the source, identifying the goods or services of one trader 
from others), the condition is often considered curable and relative, as the acquisition of 
distinctiveness through use may lead to protection. 
Trade mark laws in different jurisdictions have different statutory requirements for 
eligible signs, some broader than others.53 To a certain extent, WTO-TRIPs agreement has 
harmonized the definition of signs to include “any signs, or any combination of signs, capable 
 
 
 
50 http://www.wi-fi.org/ 
51 See  Van de Laan, supra n. 7. 
52 See for an international survey of national laws, WIPO Study on Misappropriation of Signs, 
[hereinafter WIPO Study] (2012), prepared and edited by Seftleben Martin, available on the internet 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/cdip_9/cdip_9_inf_5.pdf,  last accessed 23.3.2012 at 281. 
53 See generally, WIPO Report, supra n. 52 
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of distinguishing the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertaking.”54 
Additionally, the visual perceptibility is allowed to be used as a condition of registration.55 
Similarly, the Community Trademark Regulation provides that signs that are graphically 
representable  to  be  eligible  for  registration. 56  Excluded  from  this  would  include  such 
indications and signs as smell, sound and textures that can only be perceived through touch 
alone which may nonetheless distinguish goods and service of one business from those of 
others. In contrast, the US Lanham Act has a broad statutory definition without visible 
perceptibility requirement, 57 with the case law removing categorical distinction of the types 
of protectable signs.58  As a result, shapes, sounds, scents as well as flavouring are all eligible 
as signs protectable with trade mark rights. 
Admittedly, the market practices are such that firms and traders are using all types of 
experiences of consumers as indicators for the sources of goods or services that would lead 
ultimately  form  the  image  of  brand. 59  Anyone  who  has  been  to  an  IKEA  outlet  or 
Abercrombie & Fitch store can attest, stores use simultaneously signs, sounds and smells 
through signature scents, music playlists, typical interior layout to create a certain ambiance 
for the consumers to identify their goods and services. Indeed, registration of the trade mark 
often forms only a part of the firms’ marketing and advertising strategies to generate brand 
experiences. Against this backdrop, maintaining the formalistic ontological categories of signs 
to identify sources may seem remnants of ancient marking practices where marketing and 
advertising were mainly done through text and visible perceptible media only. In sum, while 
reference to the signs in public domain would be logically outside the protection of trade mark, 
and despite the general persistence of the visible perceptibility requirement in various national 
laws, practices of using non traditional indicators to distinguish goods and services seem to 
shrink the public domain signs that remain available through the operation of definition of the 
signs. 
This puts more emphasis on the doctrine that would reject the registration and the 
protection of signs. Certain type of signs are categorically ineligible for protection even if 
they may meet the quality of an eligible mark in the law and may be considered distinctive. 
One good example of this is provided as common patrimony signs in the Paris Convention. 
Article 6ter of the Paris Convention provides a standard to refuse registration of common 
patrimony signs such as state emblems, official hallmarks, and emblems of intergovernmental 
organizations.60 National trade mark laws often provide further ground for refusal for signs 
which  may  be  considered  deserving  respects  such  as  signs  of  royal  houses  or  for  its 
authenticity or for signs whose object elements are particularly disparaging to particular group 
of  ethnicity,  either  through  specific  statutes  or  based  on  public  policy  grounds.61 The 
 
54 TRIPs Agreement, Article 15. 
55 Id. 
56 Community Trademark Regulation Article 4. 
57 15 U.S.C. § 1127, providing that  “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof… used by a person …to identify and distinguish his or her goods ... from those manufactured or sold by 
others and to indicate the source of the goods.” 
58                 Notably, in the US, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162ñ63 (1995). See 
also Dinwoodie,  Graeme  B. ‘The Death of Ontology:  A Teleological  Approach  to Trademark  Law’, 84 Iowa 
L.Rev. 611 (1999). 
59 Michael Morrison,  Sarah Gan,  Chris Dubelaar  and Harmen Oppewal, ‘In-store music and 
aroma influences on shopper behavior and satisfaction’, Journal of Business Research 64 (2011) 558–564 
60 The Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, signed in Paris, France, on 
March 20, 1883. 
61 For example, in Korea, Korean Trade Mark Act, Art 7(1)(ii) and in Japan Japanese Trade Mark 
Act, sec 4(1) (vii).  See also, JPO Trial (Rejection) no 2007-2079, rejecting registration for a mark that has an 
American flag on a humorous image, which was deemed disrespectful to American people. Text of the trial 
available on JPO’s searchable trial database,  http://www.ipdl.inpit.go.jp/Shinpan/shinpan.htm, accessed 
15.3.2011. 
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eligibility requirement in the definition of a mark is absolute in the sense that acquired 
distinctiveness of does not cure the ineligibility of the protection. Similarly, the rejection of 
common patrimony signs is considered nearly absolute worldwide in the sense that these signs 
are not to be used as trade marks with few exceptional cases. 
Conversely, the signs that are ineligible for protection would remain available for both 
commercial or non commercial communications. Indications that cannot constitute a sign 
such as smell, taste and sound would, for example remain available in countries where 
visibility  perceptibility  is  required  to  constitute  trade  mark. 62  Scent,  sound  and  taste 
indications would fail to constitute eligible subject matter of trade mark protection. Thus 
referencing to the smell, taste sound indications in commercial speech would remain available 
for the public as well as for the competitors. Similarly, consumers and the competitors would 
be allowed to make references to descriptive and generic signs, images and terms as they 
would be available in the public domain for the consumers and the competitors to use even in 
the  context of  trade  and  referencing to  these  public  domain  signs  would  be  allowed.63 
Likewise, even though word forms typical trade marks, both in Korea64 and Japan,65 catch 
phrases, slogans and popular one liners are considered to be ineligible for protection. Notably 
the Patent Court refused the trade mark registration of  “Be the Reds!” which was a slogan 
used widely by Korean football supporters and football fan clubs and associations during the 
2002 Korean World Cup.66 
However, office practices in various countries show that non traditional marks such as 
sound marks, scents marks are gradually allowed to be registered. For example, in Japan, 
there is a legislative initiative to revise the law to allow registration of moving images, 
hologram, single colour and  sound  marks.67 For  the purpose  of  registration, practices in 
Europe seem to suggest that sound marks may well be graphically represented by musical 
notes68 and the scents may also objectively be represented by specific description such as 
“fresh cut grass” for tennis balls.69 The pressure to remove the formal categories of signs is 
also found in the TRIPs-plus type bilateral free trade agreements which call for the parties to 
remove visible perceptibility requirement from the national law.70 In sum, excluded signs that 
would be typically belong to public domain seem to be shrinking. 
Furthermore, exclusion from registration does not always mean the signs would be 
available for the public. Some jurisdictions, in the implementation of the Paris Convention 
Article 6ter, not only prohibit the registration but also prohibit the use of these common 
 
 
62 Id at 284. 
63 Id, at 281-284. 
64 JPO Examination Guideline , JPO Trademark Examination 
Guideline,http://www.jpo.go.jp/cgi/linke.cgi?url=/ tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/tt1302-001.htm (English) last accessed 
om15.10.2011, at Chap I Part 8. 
65 KIPO Trademark Examination Guideline,   KIPO Trademark Examination Guideline, 
http://www.kipo.go.kr/kpo/user.tdf?a=user.html.HtmlApp&c=3071&catmenu=m02_03_03 (Korean), last 
accessed on 15.10. 2011 at Sec 7. 
66 Korean Patent Court, Decision of Oct 24, 2007, Case no 2007 Huh 6409 [Be the Reds]. 
67 Smell mark is not included.  See the Minutes of 22th Meeting of the Subcommittee on 
Trademark System, Industrial Structure Council, Intellectual Property Committee under Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry, at p 16. (in Japanese only), accessible at JPO’s website, 
http://www.jpo.go.jp/shiryou/toushin/shingikai/pdf/ t_mark22/t_mark_gijiroku22.pdf  (last accessed Mar. 15, 
2011). 
68 See for example,  discussing the possibility, of graphically representing musical notes, in the 
Opinion of Advocate General Colomer of April 3, 2003, in case C-283/01, Shield Mark/Kist, para. 52 
69 See for example, Case R 156/1998-2, Vennootschap Onder Firma Senta Aromatic Mktg., 1999 
E.T.M.R. 429 (CTM No. 000428870). 
70 See for example, Sec. 18.2.(1) Free Trade Agreement between the Republic of Korea and the 
United States of America, signed on 30.6.2007  http://www.fta.go.kr/pds/fta_korea/usa/eng/2E_all.pdf (last 
accessed Mar. 15, 2011) 
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patrimony signs.71 In this case, exclusion does not mean that they may be used in general. As 
national flags and state emblems are often subject to national regulations including criminal 
laws, the prohibition on referencing to this particular common patrimony signs could very 
well be based on such regulations. The exclusion of common patrimony signs from trade 
mark registration may also mean that the use of the signs may not be arbitrarily controlled by 
private right holders, but rather by the regulation of the national or inter-governmental 
organizations who are steward of common patrimony in a sense. In other words, restriction as 
the trade mark registration of common patrimony signs do no always mean that the signs are 
in the public domain and remain available. 
Protection of the signs related to the Olympic movement illustrates this point well. 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) is not an inter-governmental organization but non- 
governmental not-for-profit organization.72 All Olympic properties including the Olympic 
symbol, flag, motto and emblem are owned by IOC.73 The Charter of 2011 declares in its 
section 7, that: 
“….All rights to any and all Olympic properties, as well as all rights to the use 
thereof, belong exclusively to the IOC, including but not limited to the use for any 
profit-making, commercial or advertising purposes. The IOC may license all or part of 
its rights on terms and conditions set forth by the IOC Executive Board.”74 
 
As a non-intergovernmental organization, the IOC does not benefit from the protection 
under the Paris Convention Article 6ter. However, the Olympic symbol is excluded from 
registration in many national trade mark laws.75 In some instance, the prohibition from 
registration in national trade mark law was so strict that the Korean Supreme Court has once 
notoriously refused the registration by the IOC in 1997.76 In some nations, the exclusion is 
found on the Nairobi Treaty of 1981 which reiterates the exclusion.77 Article 1 of the treaty 
obligates the signatory states to, 
“refuse or to invalidate the registration as a mark and to prohibit by appropriate 
measures the use, as a mark or other sign, for commercial purposes, of any sign 
consisting of or containing the Olympic symbol, as defined in the Charter of the 
International Olympic Committee, except with the authorization of the International 
Olympic Committee.” 78 
 
History behind the conception of the Olympics and philosophy of the Olympic 
movement make the Olympics an iconic event of global common patrimony. Despite the 
strong symbolic value of the event, the authorization of use is strictly controlled by the IOC. 
In other words, the exclusion of trade mark registration, the signs of Olympics are far from 
being available. Often the national laws prohibits uses concerning nearly all aspects of the 
signs to the degree that the reference to the event thorough the use of the word “Olympics” in 
 
 
71 For example, the Article 3 of the Korean Act on Unfair Comtititon Prevention and Business 
Secret Protection, prohibits the use of the signs belong to Paris Convention Art 6ter. 
72 The Olympic Charter of July 2011, Sec.1. Text Available from Internet, 
http://www.olympic.org/Documents/olympic_charter_en.pdf, (Last Accessed Mar 15 2011) 
73 Id, Sec.7. 
74 Id.  Italics added. 
75 See for example, UK Trademark Act Section 3(4) and Section 3(5) of the Trade Marks Act., 
Korean Trademark Act, Art7(1)(i)ter, Japanese Trademark Act  Section 4(1)(vi). In the US, 36 U.S.C. 
§220506(a).  See also U.S. PTO Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure, § 1205.01(d) (2011). 
76 Supreme Court Decision of Jun 13, 1997. Case no 96Hu 1774 [IOC], This situation is no 
longer true as the trade mark act article 7(1)(i)ter is amended to allow the registration by the famous international 
organization of their own marks. 
77 Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of the Olympic Symbol, 1981. 
78 Article 1, id. Italics added. 
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commercial communication and any association to the event are often strictly prohibited, 
either through trade mark law or through special legislations regulating the right to be 
associated with the event. IOC has been actively enforcing their mark right and the 
enforcement of the trade mark Olympics committee show that the protection was quite 
extensive to the degree that in the US, the Supreme Court ruled that the use of the word 
‘Olympics’ was strictly subject to permission of the US Olympic committee so that if such 
permission was not given, the word could not be used even as a signal for other event such as 
the gay olympics.79 In Japan, in 1988, a trade mark registration for a word mark ‘Go-Rin (five 
rings)’ was rejected. JPO held that the Japanese word ‘Go-Rin’ was used synonymous to the 
word Olympics in Japanese and thus the sign was considered conceptually similar to the 
famous Japanese word mark ‘Olympic’, which Japanese Olympics Committee (J.O.C) 
exclusively controls.80 Similarly, in 1998, JPO rejected registration for a symbol mark of five 
interlinked apple shaped rings arranged in the manner of Olympic symbol.81 As there are 
heavy sponsorship of the Olympic event, not only the use of the sign, but the indirect 
associated uses are licensed and regulated sometimes based on the trade mark law doctrine 
that protect marks with reputation, but also through special legislations.82 
In sum, the references to the public domain signs i.e. the signs and indications that are 
excluded from the scope of trade mark registration, would be allowed and indications that are 
ineligible for protection would remain available. However, while the doctrines in law that 
safeguard the public domain signs through excluding indications from protection are still in 
place the very rationale that the public now communicates meanings through all sensory 
experiences seems to shrink the boundary of the public domain by expanding the protectable 
signs. This tendency of expansion seem to redefine the function of the public domain in trade 
mark law, as a reservoir for potentially registrable signs that are readily claimable, rather than 
a reservoir of signs and indication that shall remain available for the public to use. 
Furthermore, the exclusion from the trade mark registration in the law does not mean 
that the signs are available for the public in general to use in any communications. As the near 
absolute protection of the signs related to Olympics shows, even in case where the interests of 
the public obviously manifest as in the common patrimony signs, the exclusion from 
registration does not mean that the sign will be generally available for the public or the trade 
to use or make references to, but rather to discourage socially undesirable association with 
these signs. The exclusion in the laws, thus may simply mean that a private individual may 
not claim the signs of common patrimony as trade marks. Nevertheless it may be owned and 
exclusively controlled by the public. In this context, the entity that controls the use and 
determines which uses are socially not desirable need to operate as the steward of the public 
interest. Ironically, a strong assertion of the right by the entity representing the interest of the 
public seem to result in a situation where an individual member of the public is deprived of 
the right to use and refer to the signs of common patrimony. 
 
3.2. Referential Use of a Trade mark in Non-commercial Communication 
 
In non-commercial communication, a trade mark may be referred to the communications 
without any purpose to conclude commercial transaction. A classic understanding on the trade 
mark as a trade device that indicates the quality of the goods or services by a trader, would put 
 
 
79 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522 (1987). 
80 Japanese Patent and Trademark Office,  Decision of  Feb 25, 1988, Case  Showa (58) no. 
23669, [Go-rin (Five Ring)] 
81 Japanese Patent and Trademark Office, Decision of  Nov. 27, 1998, Case Heisei (9) no. 15155 
82 For the emergence of right to associate with an event, see,  Dana Ellis, Teresa Scassa, Benoit 
Séguin, ‘Framing ambush marketing as a legal issue: An Olympic perspective’, Sport Management Review, 
Volume 14, Issue 3, August 2011, Pages 297-308. 
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the reference to the trade marks outside the context of trade. When signs are protected as trade 
marks, the trade mark laws often contain doctrines that allow use of signs and keep signs 
nonetheless usable by the public. Most notably, the notion of use in trade one of the doctrines 
that are used to limit the assertion of trade mark right against references made in non 
commercial context. As a doctrine that defines the scope of a trade mark right as a right that 
allow the right holder to exclude other from using the signs only in the course of trade, the 
trade mark use doctrine leaves the trade marks available to be used outside the trade context. 
National laws on the notion of use in trade differ. However, a generalised picture may 
be drawn based on the TRIPs agreement. The TRIPs agreement provides in the article 16, 
paragraph 1 that, 
“The owner of a registered trademark shall have the exclusive right to prevent all third 
parties not having the owner's consent from using in the course of trade identical or 
similar signs for goods or services which are identical or similar to those in respect of 
which the trademark is registered where such use would result in a likelihood of 
confusion. In case of the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a 
likelihood of confusion shall be presumed.”83 
 
The minimum rule on the scope of right that a right holder has is based on four 
elements – use in the course of trade, identical or similar signs, identical or similar goods or 
services, likelihood of confusion, which is presumed only in the case of double identity. 
However, the article does not provide any further indicia toward what each of the concept 
would be and the legislative examples related to the TRIPs article 16(1) are not uniform. 
Among these elements, more relevant to the case of referential use would be the 
notion of use in the course of trade. Referential use of a trade mark in non commercial 
communication would typically include use such as private communication, news reporting, 
use in political commentary, parody and cultural context. Even when there is no concrete and 
explicit exception in the law allowing these uses in the national laws, the concept of use in 
trade and use as a trade mark may excuse these uses. 
Despite the importance of the concept of use in the course of trade, national trade 
mark laws approach this concept with some variations. Furthermore, the use in the course of 
trade or its variant doctrine of use as a trade mark often distinguish the protected uses in trade 
from other uses through examining facts concerning the nature of the use (i.e. commercial or 
not) and facts concerning the modes and manner of uses (i.e. use in relation to goods and 
service, and  in  the  function  of  a  trade  mark.)  Some  national trade  mark  laws  have  an 
additional requirement of use in the course of trade as a trademark or in the function of a trade 
mark.84 Logically, where a trade mark is referred to in non commercial speech, the mark 
would not be used in the primary function as a source indicator. Focusing only on this so 
called primary function of a trade mark, referencing a trade mark in this regard in the cultural, 
political or religious context as well as description of the quality would fall easily outside the 
use as a trade mark. 
In Europe, and in the US, focuses seems to be on the commercial nature of the use. 
ECJ has ruled that the use in the course of trade is a use “in the context of commercial activity 
with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter.”85 Accordingly, the use of a 
trade mark in strictly non commercial private communications would be outside the use in the 
course of trade. Similarly US Lanham Act adopts the expression “use in commerce”86 and the 
case laws in the US also shows that the courts will not likely to find the defendant who does 
 
 
83 TRIPs Agreement, Article 16, paragraph (1), italics added. 
84 See for a survey, WIPO Report, supra n.52. 
85 See ECJ, Google, supra n. 7 at para. 50, and Arsenal supra n.7 para. 40. 
86 15 U.S.C. §1127 
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not engage in commercial communication liable. For example, the courts have found such 
uses of trade mark as in the internet gripe sites or fan sites that do not engage in selling or 
advertising goods or services non-commercial.87 In contrast, in Japan and Korea, the notion of 
use in trade focuses more on the trader, and statutory definition of use. The use in trade 
generally implied from the definition of signs eligible for protection, namely that a sign has to 
be connected to goods and services of the persons who engage in the business. 88 From this, 
the use in the course of trade is understood to mean habitual uses in the profession as a trader 
and thus non-habitual uses of the signs in private communication would fall outside the scope. 
However, notably in Japan, the definition of use now includes electronic display89 and based 
on this definition, a Japanese court held a meta-tag use to constitute a use in the course of 
trade.90 In contrast, Korean trade mark act does not include electronic display in the statutory 
definition of use and thus, the Supreme Court held using a trademark as part of the domain 
name was considered not as one of the elaborated uses in the course of trade, as long as there 
is no additional conduct such as selling identical or similar goods through the website.91 
Based on this, a referential use of a trade mark in non-commercial and private 
communication is in principle may seem to be outside the scope of trade mark protection. 
However, the boundary of commercial and non-commercial communication get blurred and 
the commercial, when so called “private communication” is done through ubiquitous media. 
Even when a speech does not clearly propose commercial transaction, communications are 
often mixed. Notably, internet platforms that enable blogging and broadcastings often include 
advertisement and sponsorships that allow the users to use their services without fee. 
Referential use of trade marks in blogs as a blog post entry, or in the domain names griping 
particular products have raised some questions whether such use would constitute use outside 
the trade.92 While the griping or fan sites without any association of goods or services may be 
outside the trade may be viewed strictly a non commercial communication, sites may be 
supported by advertisement including those of the competitors who may indirectly benefit 
from the non commercial communications. Similarly, fan sites may market fan goods, make 
unavoidable references to the signs, symbols and images of the famous artists or creative 
works may raise similar questions. In social network sites, the users may associate a particular 
goods or service by becoming a friend or like a product of the official sites of the trade mark 
holder through re-post or re-twit. Further users may also associate with a goods by creating 
vanity urls based on user names such as  @ferrari, or www.facebook.com/love.ferrari. As was 
the initial phase of domain name grabs, there are a mix of cybersquatting and genuinely uses 
by the fans or devoted customers.93 
Further, reputation of a mark may raise questions. The reputation itself makes it easier 
to use a sign with reputation to convey meanings more effectively and thus the traders and the 
consumers may more likely to use signs with reputation in commerce or in other context. Due 
to the reputation or a notoriety, some marks convey powerful impression and imagery to the 
public. For example, signs and images such as Mattel’s Barbie or Disney’s Mickey Mouse are 
often used to comment and critique certain aspects of the American culture. Likewise, to 
 
 
87 See, e.g., TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433, 437-38 (5th Cir. 2004). 
88 Japanese Trademark Act, Sec.2(3) and Korean Trademark Act, Art 2(1)(vi) 
89 Japanese Trademark Act Sec 2(3)(vii). 
90 Osaka District Court (2005) Decision of Heisei 17, Dec.8, Case no Heisei 16 (wa) 12032 
[Metatag]. 
91 Korean Supreme Court (2004), Decision of Feb 13, 2004, Case no 2001 (Da) 57709 [Rolls 
Royce] allowing the domain name use, Korean text of the decisions are available on the searchable database of 
Ministry of Government Legislation,  http://www.law.go.kr/main.html, (last accessed Mar. 15, 2011). 
92 See generally, Lipton, Jacquelin ‚Internet Domain Names, Trademarks and Free Speech’, 
Edward Elgar Publishing. (2010). 
93 See for example,  Curtin, Thomas J,  ’The Name Game: Cybersquatting And Trademark 
Infringement On Social Media Websites,’ 19 Journal of Law & Policy 353. (2010). 
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highlight the interests of the oil industry in the U.S. war against the Iraq, in 2003, Daily 
Mirror ran a cover page using well known marks of oil companies.94 
Such references uses of trade marks are not limited to famous or well known marks, 
nor limited to reference for political criticisms. Indeed, the function of the trade mark in 
creation and communication of meaning is highlighted to the degree that scholars claim that 
there are linguistic function in trade mark in addition to more traditional function of a trade 
mark that which identify a source for the goods or services.95 For example, the consumers or 
the general public including the traders may use signs in cultural contexts (i.e. books and 
other  creative  works  and  expressions),  in  creation  of  fan  and  enthusiasts  materials  for 
products, in search results, in product reviews and critiques. 
Furthermore, some of the signs of reputation is created based on the large inputs from 
the public. To organize a mega events such as Olympic games, the public may fund the event 
directly as taxpayers, but also as audiences and consumers of merchandises that privately 
finance and sponsor the events.96 In a public sport event, such as the Olympic Games where 
the athletes compete under national identities, the public needs to participate in the event not 
only as a passive consumers of the events and spectacles, but also through communicating the 
experiences with other members of the public, and sometimes using the signs that are 
associated with  these  events. 97 Spectators and  fans  of  a  sporting  event, amateur or 
professional, also relive their experiences or contribute to the creation of values associated 
with the event, by sharing images of the events. Recounting the event may take many forms 
and  symbols,  signs  and  images  are  often  the  most  efficient  ways  to  communicate and 
comment on the experiences and sometimes form an identity as supporters. 
The value and visibility of  social media sites of  the trade mark holder similarly 
benefits from the participation of the consumers as friends and fans of their social media sites. 
Re-posting or re-twit of the official posting or twit of the trade mark holder, by the consumers 
with  large  “followers” validly form  word  of  mouth  type  product promotion which  will 
increase values of the product. Further even when such uses may not implicate the trade mark 
infringement liability of the consumers or users in general, the site operators, and other 
platform providers do gain financial benefits from the users’ behaviour on these sites. 
In sum, even when the trade mark law would allow strictly non-commercial and 
private referential uses, legality of such uses seem to be tied to the shifting boundary of 
commercial and non commercial, as well as private and public communication. Most of the 
prevailing communication on social media, in a strict sense is not a private dialogue and often 
not only the platform but also the bloggers themselves engage in indirect product 
advertisement. In this context, if the doctrinal touchstone is based on the concept of trade or 
commerce, it is not suitable to deal with these new referential uses. 
 
 
 
3.3. Referential Use of Trade Marks in Commercial Communication 
 
 
 
 
94 Image of the cover can be retrieved  http://www.tedmills.com/images/dailymirror.jpg, last 
accessed on 10. October 2011. 
95 See for example, Katz, Ariel, ‘Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of 
Trademarks,’ Brigham Young University Law Review (2010) 1555. 
96 See for example, on the financing of the Olympics Preuss, Holger, The economics of staging 
the Olympics: a comparison of the Games, 1972-2008, (Edward Elgar Publishers, 2004). 
97 Case Reference I ZR 60/09; Hartplatzhelden.de,  Bundesgerichtshof, 28 October 2010. See 
report of Clark, Birgit, ‘Bundesgerichthof decides in Hartplatzhelden.de case’, Journal of Intellectual Property 
Law & Practice  2011, Vol 6. No. 4, pp 221-222. See also Ohly, ‘Hartplatzhelden.de  oder: Wohin mit dem 
unmittelbaren Leistungsschutz?’, GRUR 2010, 487; Ehmann, Timo, Monopole für Sportverbände durch 
ergänzenden Leistungsschutz?’ GRUR Int 2009 pp. 659-664. 
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More controversial developments in trade marks laws for the last decades has been in the area 
of referential uses in commercial communication. Referential uses of another’s trade mark 
typically include comparative advertising, descriptive and qualitative references for spare 
parts or interoperable products, satire or parody in commercial context. As explored in the 
above, using a trade mark in the course of trade is precisely the conduct that the trade mark 
law aims to regulate and national laws often have limited exceptions allowing referential use 
in commercial communication. 
The article 17 of the TRIPS agreement allows members to provide “limited exceptions” 
for  the rights “such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided that such exceptions take 
account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties.”98 
However, it does not provide sufficient clarity for limitation nor the substantive ceiling for the 
restriction that may be imposed.99 Although it mentions the “fair use of descriptive terms” 
which is typically found in national laws as an example of such exceptions, referential uses 
may go beyond this limited notion of a fair use. 100   More elaboration is found in the MPI 
TRIPS Amendment Proposal.101 The proposal suggests the amendment of the article 17 and it 
includes uses in the course of trades, 
“i) for descriptive purposes, like indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, 
intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of 
rendering of the service, or other characteristics of goods or services; 
ii) in order to provide information in connection with sales of goods or services that 
are legitimately commercialised on the market concerned; 
iii) for other marketing purposes providing relevant information, in particular 
comparative advertising; 
iv) in a satirical or parodist manner, or in other modes of use covered by rules 
applying to freedom of speech and/or freedom of art in the Member concerned; 
v) of a natural person’s own name….”102 
 
Descriptive, informational, comparative and satirical or parodist uses are all examples 
of referential uses of trade marks in commercial communications. As argued in the above, a 
trade mark is a device that allows communication of meaning and due to its symbolic nature, 
trade marks are highly effective communication tool to provide information. For example, to 
inform the consumers of the nature of the products, such as smell-alike perfume, it would be 
easier to describe the smell with comparison list that the product X smells like the famous Y, 
rather than to describe the product by listing the elements and chemical qualities. The 
consumers may not be likely to be confused as they will see the reference to a well-known 
mark, not as an indication of a source or an indication that the producer of the famous Y 
endorsed the smell-alike perfume and would see the smell-alike product “ for what it is and no 
more.”103 
 
 
98 Article 17, TRIPs  Agreement, supra n. 13 
99 In this context, see Grosse Ruse - Khan, Henning and Annette Kur: ‘Enough is Enough – The 
Notion of Binding Ceilings in International Intellectual Property Protection’. In: Levin, Marianne and Annette 
Kur (Eds.): Intellectual Property Rights in a Fair World Trade System. (2011), p. 359 - 407.  See also Ramsey, 
Lisa P. ‘Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect Trademarks’ Yale Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 35, No. 405, (2010) 
100 See the Proposals for Amendment of TRIPs, jointly prepared by the Max-Planck-Institute  for 
Intellectual Property and Competition Law and the Institute for Intellectual Property and Market Law at the 
University of Stockholm, [hereinafter MPI TRIPs Amendment Proposal], available on the internet, 
http://www.ip.mpg.de/shared/data/pdf/proposed_amendments_to_trips_20110504.pdf , Last accessed on 1 
March 2012. 
101 MPI TRIPs Amendment Proposal, supra n 100 at 16-17 
102 Id.  Italics are added. 
103 L’Oréal SA v Bellure NV, [2007] EWCA Civ 968, [2008] RPC 196, at para 63. 
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National laws include limitations to trade mark right or at least a defence against 
claims of trade mark infringement for these types of communication. For example, the US has 
a statute acknowledging fair use defence.104 Accordingly, a fair use of a trade mark as a name, 
descriptive use of goods or service or geographic origin would benefit from this defence.105 At 
the same time as the notion of use of a trade mark limits the liability, when the trade mark was 
not used “on or in connection with goods or services.”106 Similarly, in Europe, the trademark 
directive provides exceptions, conditioned to the honest business practices, as to the use as a 
name or address, use as indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, 
value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of rendering of the service, or 
other characteristics of goods or services, necessary indication of the intended purpose of a 
product or service, in particular as accessories or spare parts.107In Korea and Japan, similar 
exceptions are found.108 Thus uses as an own name, common name or indication, descriptive 
indication, customary indication, or as an indispensable functional shape are exempted. In 
Korea and Japan, courts tend to rely on the principle of use as a trade mark to excuse the 
referential use that is necessary to communicate the information for selling the goods are 
allowed by case laws.109 For example, Tokyo District court in Japan found no trademark use 
when ink cartridges for a Brother printer were marketed, bearing the label “for Brother 
printers,” as the word “for” makes it clear that the use is for reference purposes.110 Likewise 
the Supreme Court of Korea found that using a trademark relating to a computer program for 
a manual for that computer program111 or using a trademark to indicate a technical or a quality 
standard112 did not constitute trademark use, as these uses were made for reference purposes. 
The above observation shows that while the concrete articulation of the exceptions in 
the statutes has the benefit of certainty, a catalogue of exceptions may hinder the application 
of the exceptions to new uses. Thus even when there are concrete exception are found in 
statutes, when new practices emerge such as comparative advertising and keyword advertising, 
the courts often either need to invent a new function of a trade mark right to restrict the use, or 
to search for elastic notion through interpretation of the law. Use as a trade mark which is tied 
to the core function of a trade mark, has been one such notion. Use as a trade mark may not 
only be used to limit the scope of right, when a court finds a new function such as “investment 
function,”  when  the  use  affects  that  aspect  of  a  trade  mark,  the  court  could  find 
infringement.113 Courts in Japan and Korea have sometimes used to extend the protection 
against a reference use.114 In other words, as judicially created doctrine, ‘use as a trade mark’ 
 
 
 
 
 
104 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) 
105 Id. 
106 See, e.g., Bosley Medical Institute, Inc. v. Kremer, 403 F.3d 672, 677 (9th Cir. 2005). 
107 Also,  Directive 2006/114/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 
2006 concerning misleading and comparative advertising, OJ L 376 of 27th December 2006. See also, Ohly, 
supra n.11 and Van der Laan, supra n.7 
108 Japanese Trademark Act Sec. 26 and Korean Trademark Act Art. 51. 
109 Brother Industries Ltd. v. OHM Electronics Inc & Dynic Corp , Tokyo District Court  (2004) 
Decision of Heisei 16, Jun 23, Case no.  Heisei 15 (Wa) 29488.  Korean Supreme Court, Decision of Oct 10, 
2003, Case no 2002 (Da) 63640 [Windows]; Supreme Court, decision of Jun.10, Case no 2005 (Do) 1637 [Sony]. 
110 Brother Industries Ltd. v. OHM Electronics Inc & Dynic Corp, Id. 
111 Korean Supreme Court, Decision of Oct 10, 2003, Case no 2002 (Da) 63640 [Windows]; 
Supreme Court, decision of Jun.10, Case no 2005 (Do) 1637 [Sony]. 
112 Korean Supreme Court, Decision of Jun.13, 2003, Case no 2001 (Da) 79068. [SCA] 
113 Interflora, supra n.47 
114 Shinko Corp and others v. Shouei KK.  Osaka District Court (2005) Decision of Heisei 17 Jul 
25, Case no.  Heisei 16 (Wa) 8276, [Pump Spare parts], (spare parts); Osaka District Court Decision of Heisei 6 
Feb 24, Reported in 1552 Hanji 1552 139 [MAGAMP K] (repackaging); Korean Supreme Court Decision of Apr. 
11, 2003, Case no 2002 (Do) 3445 [Fuji Film] 
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may depend on facts of each use, and thus may not be provide predictable outcome.115 For 
most of the prevailing communication in internet and social media, to allow referencing 
possible, a general exception of such as “fair use” based on statutes,116 other than the use in 
trade  or  commercial use  or  trade  mark  use  theory  may  provide both  predictability and 
flexibility. 
 
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
 
From the lenses of intellectual property right, the public domain is the area where the private 
claims to the property ends and in this sense limits the claims of the private property, and the 
users may engage in the conduct of use of the subject matters that are considered to be within 
the public domain, without the authorization of the right holders. Framed in this manner, the 
legality of using words, signs, image and information would look closely on the nature of the 
objects and identity of similarity of these objects are those that are within the public domain. 
From the lenses of property then, whether a conduct of use is excused or not then depends on 
how similar the object is the public domain objects. In contrast to this, from the lenses of 
conduct oriented regulation, such as unfair competition Law, the public domain is where the 
law does not sanction the use of  the resources as an illegal conduct as such, and thus 
extracting values from the conducts such as imitation and copying will not be perceived 
tortuous. 
While this academic division of object of property and the conduct seems simple, this 
is often not the case in practice. In practice, any uses of valuable intellectual subject matters 
involve the question determining the nature of the objects and the conducts which are often 
conflated. As sketched in the above, and elsewhere in this book, this is more complex in cases 
where a new right is seen to be emerging or the values is seen to be protected by way of 
extending causes of action against non authorized use, regardless of the jurisdiction. 
As the RT Jacob L.J has succinctly put, “truth in the market places matters – even if 
does not attract quite the strong emotions as the right of a journalist or politician to speak the 
truth.”117 Freedom to inform the consumers of the information related to the goods or services 
serves the foundation for a concept of the consumers who are sovereign who could exercise 
their interest through selection. When information are hidden or not communicated accurately, 
a rational decision making will not be possible. At the interface of intellectual property and 
regulation of unfair competition, an articulation of the public’s right to make references using 
signs and trade marks may ground the role of the public domain in promoting the truth in 
market place as well. 
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